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BILLS AND NOTES
HOLDER'S AUTHORITY TO ACCELERATE MATURITY DATE OF A
PROMISSORY NOTE

A

PROVISION in a promissory note in Faulk v. Futch'
stated:
". in the event any default is made in the payment of any installment
of principal or interest hereon, or any part thereof, when due, such
default shall at the option of the holder, at once mature the whole of
this note."

The dominant question presented in this case was whether the
holders of the note were authorized to accelerate the maturity
date and to declare the entire amount of the principal due and
payable.
The instrument provided that it was payable "in San Antonio,
Bexar County, Texas," but no specific place was given at which
the payment could be made. The holders of the instrument resided in Seguin, Guadalupe County, Texas, and did not maintain
a place of business in Bexar County. The proper place of pay.
ment was held to be the maker's place of business in San Antonio,
Bexar County, Texas. This holding is in line with the provisions
of the Negotiable Instrument Law2 and Texas decisions.3
Having made -this determination, the court then set forth
what it considered to be the well established rule that,
Tex ..............
I ------------

214 S. W . (2d) 614 (1948).
2 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5937, § 73, "Presentment for payment is
made at the proper place: ... (3) where no place of payment is specified and no address
is given and the instrument is presented at the usual place of business or residence of
the person to make payment."
3 Parker v. Mazur, 13 S. W. (2d) 174, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) writ of error dism'd;
Griffin v. Reilley, 275 S. W. 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925; cf. Barnes v. Rushing 5 S. W.
(2d) 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ; Moore v. Kenmeyer, 271 S. W. 653 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925); O'Connor v. Kirby Investment Co.. 262 S. W. 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) writ
of error refused.
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"... where the acceleration clause in a promissory note leaves it
optional with the holder whether he shall declare the whole amount due
upon failure to pay any installment of principal or interest, such holder
cannot without presentment for payment, exercise his option to declare
the whole amount due, if no specific place of payment is expressed in
the note, until it has been presented to the payor at the latter's place
of business. '
This rule was first announced in Texas by the court of civil
appeals in Griffin v. Reilley,5 although it had earlier been said
in Beckhain v. Scott6 that in such a situation to allege the exercise

of such option by the holder and to show that formal demand was
made for payment, was a sufficient showing of the exercise of
such option. The rule has since been set out in several other
civil appeals decisions.'
There are decisions of the appellate courts of this state which
have held that institution of suit within a reasonable time after

default in payment of one of a series of notes or of an installment of principal or interest is sufficient notice of an election
to exercise the option to accelerate maturity as per the terms of

the instrument!

At first glance this seems to conflict with the

_........... Tex ---....................... 214 S. W . (2d) 614, 616 (1948).
' 275 S. W. 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
6 142 S. W. 80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
7Curtis v. Speck, 130 S. W. (2d) 348 (Tex. Civ. App.. 1939) writ of error refused;
Ladd v. Anderson, 89 S. W. (2d) 1041 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) rev'd on other grounds,
115 S. W. (2d) 608 (Tex. Com. App. 1938); Ross v. Isaacs, 54 S. W. (2d) 182 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932) writ of error dism'd; Parker v. Mazur, 13 S. W. (2d) 174 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928) writ of error dism'd.
8 Natali v. Witthaus, 134 Tex. 513, 135 S. W. (2d) 969 (Tex. Com. App. 1940) ; Seaboard Bank & Trust Co. v. Amuny, 23 S. W. (2d) 287 (Tex. Com. App. 1930); Kyle
v. Commercial Credit Co., 152 S. W. (2d) 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) writ of errordism'd
J. Corr; Chandler v. Guaranty Mortgage Co., 89 S. W. (2d) 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ;
Barnes v. Rushing, 5 S. W. (2d) 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ; Moore v. Kenmeyer, 271
S. W. 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; Dunkel v. Amarillo Bank & Trust Co., 222 S. W. 670
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920) writ of error refused; Stewart v. Thomas, 179 S. W. 886 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1915) ; Shearer v. Chambers County, 159 S. W. 999 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
writ of error refused; Coleman v. Garvin, 158 S. W. 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) writ of
error refused; Dieters v. Bowers, 37 Civ. App. 615, 84 S. W. 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905)
writ of error denied; Gillispie v. Brown, 30 S. W. 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) ; Luzenburg v. Bexar Building & Loan Assn., 29 S. W. 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) writ of error
denied; Kerr v. Morrison, 25 S. W. 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) ; Chase v. First Nat.
Bank of Cleburne, 1 Civ. App. 595, 20 S. W. 1027 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892).
4
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holding of the court in the Faulk case. But, a careful reading
of these cases reveals that either a special place of payment was
specified in the instruments involved or that the reports are
silent as to this fact. However, there are two civil appeals cases9
which explicitly declared that the place of payment prescribed
in the instrument was not a special place of payment within the
provisions of the Texas Negotiable Instrument Law, ° but went
on to hold in one of them" that it was not necessary to present
the note for payment, and in the other, 2 that the filing of the
suit operated as notice to the maker of the intention to exercise
the option to accelerate maturity. It seems safe to say that these
two cases are therefore overruled by the holding in the Faulk case.
As to this apparent conflict relative to the requisites of a holder
exercising the option to accelerate maturity of the instrument as
provided by its terms, it seems that the holding of the Supreme
Court in the Faulk case can be reconciled, so long as it is limited
to instruments wherein no special place of payment is specified.
However, this view has not been immune from attack in other
jurisdictions. 8 In looking at the decision of the Oregon Supreme
Court in Harrisonv. Beals," it is interesting to note that the court
criticized the case of Bardsley v. Washington Mill Co., t" which
was cited in Griffin v. Reilley and also the Faulk case. The
criticism was on the grounds that the court went out of its way
9 Barnes v. Rushing, 5 S. W. (2d) 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ; Moore v. Kenmeyer, 271
S. W. 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
10 TEx. RE;v. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5937, § 70, "Presentment for payment
is not necessary in order to charge the person primarily liable on the instrument: but if
the instrument is, by its terms, payable at a special place, and he is able and willing to
pay it there at maturity, such ability and willingness are equivalent to a tender of payment upon his part. ... "
II Barnes v. Rushing, 5 S. W. (2d) 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
12 Moore v. Kenmeyer, 271 S. W. 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
13 Corbett v. Ulsaker Printing Co., 49 N. D. 103, 190 N. W. 75 (1922) ; Harrison v.
Beals, 111 Ore. 563, 222 Pac. 728 (1924) ; the following cases have interpretated the
rule so as to give it a very limited effect: James v. Brainard Jackson & Co., 64 Wash. 175,
116 Pac. 633 (1911) ; Cook v. Strelau, 127 Wash. 128, 219 Pac. 846 (1923) ; Hartge v.
Capeloti, 136 Wash. 538, 241 Pac. 5 (1925).
14 111 Ore. 563, 222 Pac. 728 (1924).
15 54 Wash. 553, 103 Pac. 822 (1909).
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to relieve a contracting party from his express obligation and that
the clause in Section 70 of the N.I.L.' rendering presentment to
the maker unnecessary makes no exception requiring presentment
for enforcement of the acceleration clause.
The Faulk case is also important in that for the first time
a Texas court set forth the rule allowing a waiver of the requirements of Article 5937, Section 74 of the Texas Negotiable
Instrument Law, 7 which provision gave the makers the right to
have the note' actually exhibited at the time when payment was
demanded. This rule has been adopted in other jurisdictions" and
seems justified when it is remembered that the reason for the
requirement is that the drawer or acceptor may be able to
judge (1) the genuineness of the instrument; (2) the right of
the holder to receive payment; and (3) that he may immediately
reclaim possession upon paying the amount.1 9 Therefore, the right
to require exhibition is personal, and may be waived; and if exhibition is not requested and payment is refused on other grounds,
exhibition is waived.20
REFERENCE IN A PROMISSORY NOTE TO A COLLATERAL
INSTRUMENT

Continental National Bank of Fort Worth v. Conner t involved
certain clauses in a promissory note, which had been executed at
16 See Note 9, supra.
17 Trx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5937, § 74, "The instrument must be
exhibited to the person from whom payment is demanded, and when it is paid must be
delivered up to the person paying it."
18 Freudenberg v. Lucas, 38 Cal. App. 95, 175 Pac. 482 (1918) ; Greenstein v. Kucharski, 107 Conn. 269, 140 At. 482 (1928) ; Union Bank of Louisiana v. Lea, 7 Rob. (La.)
76, 41 Am. Dec. 275 (1844) ; Legg v. Vinal, 165 Mass. 555, 43 N. E. 518 (1896) ; Porter
v. East Jordan Realty Co., 210 Mich. 398, 177 N. W. 987 (1920) ; Porter v. Thom, 40
App. Div. 34,57 N. Y. S. 879 (1899) affirmed 167 N. Y. 584,60 N. E. 1119 (1901) memo;
Hodges v. Blalock, 82 Ore. 179, 161 Pac. 396 (1916) ; Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46, 17 S.E.
739 (1893).
19 Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46, 17 S. E. 739 (1893).
20 Gilpin v. Savage, 60 Misc. 605, 112 N. Y. S. 802 (1908) affirmed 132 App. Div.
948 memo., 118 N. Y. S. 1108 (1909) memo., reversed on the facts 201 N. Y. 167, 94
N. E. 656 (1911).
21

Tex .-.........
214 S. W. (2d) 928 (1948).
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the same time that the makers entered into a mechanic's lien contract with the payee of the note. The clauses read as follows:
"Failure to pay any portion of the principal or interest hereon ... "
or failure to perform any agreement in the below mentioned lien instrument shall, at the option of the holder thereof, mature this note.
"This note is secured by mechanic's lien contract of even date between Maker and Payee relating to ... [property described] . .. to
which said mechanic's lien contract reference is hereby made."
The Supreme Court was called upon to determine if the above
quoted provisions rendered the note non-negotiable. Recognizing
the rule in this State, that before a reference in an otherwise
negotiable instrument to another agreement will make the former
non-negotiable, it must appear therefrom that the paper is to be
burdened with the conditions of that agreement, 2 the references
to the mechanic's lien contract were said to be either a mere
statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument
or a reference to the security given for the note. If the former,
such a reference is permitted by the provisions of the Texas Negotiable Instrument Law,2 3 which is but a restatement of the law
as announced by our courts for a number of years, 24 or if the
latter, such reference is also impliedly authorized by another provision of the statute.2 5 No particular phrase regarding the relationship between the note and the lien contract contained the words
"burdened with," "subject to" or their equivalent, so as to bring
it within the rule that would destroy its negotiability.
Relative to the provision entitling the noteholder to accelerate
maturity for breach by the makers of their obligations under
the contract, it was admitted that it was something different from
22 Arrington v. Mercantile Protective Bureau, Inc., 24 S. W. (2d) 383 (Tex. Com.
App. 1930) ; P. J. Williams Industries Inc. v. First State Bank of Lyford, 38 S. W. (2d)
1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) writ of error dism'd; Mountjoy Parts Co. v. San Antonio
Nat. Bank, 12 S. W. (2d) 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
28 TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5932, § 3.
24 Arrington v. Mercantile Protective Bureau Inc., 24 S. W. (2d) 383 (Tex. Com.
App. 1930).
25 Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5932, § 5.
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a mere statement of the underlying transaction, and caused the
holder to have to look to the contract to see if its terms have been
violated, only in the case he cares to accelerate maturity for this
reason. But, it did not purport to render conditional or uncertain
the maker's otherwise absolute and certain promises theretofore
contained in the note. Therefore, the note was not rendered nonnegotiable by this provision.
An example of a clause in an instrument having been declared
to be more than a mere statement of the transaction which gives
rise to the instrument, as permitted by the N.I.L.26 is that contained in the trade acceptance involved in Lane Co. v. Crum.27
The provision there declared:
"The obligation of the acceptor arises out of the purchase of goods from
the drawer, maturity being in conformity with the original terms

of purchase."

The instruments containing this clause were held non-negotiable
on the grounds that the obligation of the acceptor, according to
the terms of the clause arose, not from the instruments themselves but from a collateral transaction.
Three years after the Lane decision, the Commission of Appeals
in Arrington v. Mercantile Protective Bureau, Inc." was confronted with a trade acceptance which contained the following
clause:
"The obligation of the acceptor hereof arises out of the purchase of
goods from the drawer."

On the basis of it being construed to be nothing more than a
mere reference to the transaction out of which the obligation
arose, the instrument was held to be negotiable. It will be noted
that this clause is identical with the first part of the one involved
26 See Note 23, supra.
27 291 S. W. 1084 (Tex. Com. App. 1927) reversing 284 S. W. 980 (Tex. Civ. App.

1926).
28 24 S. W. (2d) 383 (Tex. Com. App. 1930) affirming 15 S. W. (2d) 663 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929).
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in the Lane case. However, the court went on to specifically distinguish the provision in the Lane case from the one they were
considering, on the grounds that the latter part of the clause there
involved, which reads, "maturity being in conformity with the
original terms of purchase," was susceptible of no other construction except to indicate a purpose to burden the paper with the
conditions of an extrinsic agreement as to the maturity thereof.
This result was reached, even though the trade acceptances that
were involved in the Lane case were payable respectively 60, 90,
and 120 days after date. The note in the Conner case was payable at a fixed date, just as were the above mentioned trade
acceptances, yet the provision in the note which gave the holder
the option to mature it on failure of the makers to perform any
agreement contained in the lien instrument was held not to burden
the note with the conditions of the collateral agreement. These
provisions as to the maturity of the instruments involved in the
Lane and Conner cases, while not the same, can possibly be considered as being of a like nature, and therefore raise the question whether the divergent result of these two cases is justified.
The Lane case has met with some approval in other jurisdictions,29 but the Pennsylvania Superior Court in 19410 adopted
what it termed the majority view and the one adopted by the
jurisdictions called upon most recently to determine the question
of negotiability where an identical provision to that contained in
the Lane case was involved,"' and declared the instrument to be
negotiable. This result is reached by construing the provision as
29 Westlake Mercantile Finance Corp. v. Merritt, 204 Cal. 673, 269 Pac. 620 (1928).
(Note-There seems to be no due date plainly stated in the body of the instrument) ;
First Nat. Bank, Statesville, N. C. v. Power Equipment Co., 211 Ia. 153, 233 N. W. 103
(1930).
3o State Trading Corp. v. Jordan, 146 Pa. Super. 166, 22 A. (2d) 30 (1941).
31 State Trading Corp. v. Rosen, 136 Conn. 37, 9 A. (2d) 290 (1939) ; State Trading
Corp. v. Toepfert, 304 Mass. 473, 23 N. E. (2d) 1008 (1939); Heller v. Cuddy, 172
Minn. 126, 214 N. W. 924 (1927) ; State Trading Corp. v. Smaldone, 172 Misc. 367, 15
N. Y. S. (2d) 33 (1938); State Trading Corp. v. Tobias Studio, 64 Ohio App. 516, 29
N. E. (2d) 38 (1940); Levitt v. Johnson Office Supply Co., 103 Pa. Super 76, 157 Atl.
804 (1931) (instrument considered as negotiable without any discussion).
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merely a statement of the transaction which gives rise to the
instrument and not a reference to an extrinsic instrument affecting
the time of payment. That decision listed the Lane case as one
setting out the minority view that an instrument containing such
a provision is non-negotiable.
In view of the result reached in the Conner case and the position
other jurisdictions have taken in holding instruments which contained the identical provision to that involved in the Lane case
to be negotiable, perhaps it can be expected that should this question be expressly presented to our Supreme Court, it may overrule the Lane case and adopt what has been termed the majority
view."
LIABILITY OF THE DRAWEE BANK TO THE PAYEE ON AN
INDORSEMENT MADE WITHOUT AUTHORITY

The plaintiff in Strickland Transportation Co. v. First State
Bank of Memphis3 was the payee of certain checks which had
been cashed at the drawee bank by the payee's agent, who had
authority only to accept the checks for the payee, but had no
authority to cash them and receive payment thereon. The agent
appropriated to his own use the money so paid to him, and left
for parts unknown. The checks were charged against the account
of the drawer by the drawee bank.
Plaintiff's action against the drawee bank was based on two
theories. One, that the bank was liable for wrongful conversion
of the checks, and the other, that the plaintiff as assignee of the
rights and causes of action of the drawer of the checks, could
recover for the breach of the bank's duty to its depositor in cashing the checks upon an unauthorized indorsement and thereafter
charging them to the depositor's account.
The court was unanimous in their holding that the payee could
not recover directly against the drawee bank on the theory of
32

See Note 30, supra.
..

Tex. ............ ,214 S. W. (2d) 934 (1948).
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wrongful conversion. To sustain this result, the court relied
mainly on Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Fort Worth
National Bank. 4 In that case, the Commission of Appeals, without discussion, denied liability on the part of the drawee bank,
where the suit had been brought on the conversion theory. However, the court in that decision expressly refused to approve
earlier decisions of the courts of civil appeals allowing recovery
on that theory,"6 and the Supreme Court in the Strickland case
construed this to be a rejection of the conversion theory as a
grounds of recovery. This result is not uniformly accepted in
other jurisdictions, 36 and the Texas decisions have been said to
follow the minority rule.37
In deciding if the plaintiff could recover as assignee of the
drawer's rights, the Supreme Court had before it a question of
first impression in this state in determining whether the drawer of
these checks had any cause of action that could be assigned to the
payee of these checks where the payee's agent, without authorization indorsed and cashed them, failing to account to his principal
for the proceeds.
In answering this question, the court first found it necessary to
determine if the liability of the drawer to the payee was discharged by the authorized delivery of the checks, to the payee's
agent, and their subsequent payment by the drawee bank to the
agent on his unauthorized indorsement. The conclusion of the
34 65 S. W. (2d) 276 (Tex. Com. App. 1933).
35 City National Bank & Trust Co. of Corpus Christi v. Pyramid Asbestos & Roofing

Co., 39 S. W. (2d) 1101 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) writ of error dism'd; Pierce Petroleum
Corp. v. Guaranty State Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 22 S. W. (2d) 520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
a A. Paul Goodall Real Estate & Ins. Co. v. North Birmingham American Bank, 225
Ala. 507, 144 So. 7 (1932) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Citizens & Peoples Nat. Bank of
Pensacola, 74 Fla. 385, 77 So. 104 (1917) ; Bentley, Murray & Co. v. LaSalle St. Savings
Bank, 197 Il. App. 232 (1916) ; James v. Union Nat. Bank, 238 Ill. App. 159 (1925);
Kentucky Title Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Dunavan, 205 Ky. 801, 266 S. W. 667
(1924) ; Blacker & Shepard Co. v. Granite Trust Co., 284 Mass. 9, 187 N. E. 53 (1933) ;
State v. First State Bank of Albuquerque, 38 N. M. 225, 30 P. (2d) 728 (1934) ; Burstein v. Peoples Trust Co., 143 App. Div. 165, 127 N. Y. S. 1092 (1911) ; Hartford Acci.
dent & Indemnity Co. v. Bear Butte Valley Bank, 63 S. D. 262, 275 N. W. 642 (1934).
37 Note, 12 Trx. L. REv. 226 (1934).
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majority of the court was that the better reasoned authorities and
decisions of other jurisdictions" supported the holding that the
drawer's liability was discharged when the checks were paid to the
agent. The unfortunate position in which the payee found himself
was not due to any act or omission of the drawer, but arose solely
from the unfaithfulness of the payee's own agent. Therefore, the
drawer's liability having been discharged, he had no cause of
action against the bank to assign to the plaintiff.
In a strong dissenting opinion by Jusitce Hart, in which three
other justices joined,39 it was contended that since the proceeds
of the checks were never paid to the payee or any agent authorized
to receive them, the drawer's obligation to the payee was not paid,
and the drawer was still under an obligation to pay, with the right
of a depositor to pursue its remedy against the drawee bank for
the wrongful payment of the checks. Therefore, the drawer could
for a valuable consideration, assign his cause of action to the
payee, who may then recover against the bank.
Therefore, in summary, the majority denied the payee's ability
to recover because the harm wrought by the unfaithfulness of the
agent must fall on the one who selected him and sent him out to
receive checks under an implied representation that he was worthy
38 Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Ivy Leaf Coal Co., 97 Ala. 705. 12 So. 395 (1892) ;
Mills v. Horley Hardware & Furniture Co., 129 Ark. 350, 196 S. W. 121 (1917) ; McFadden v. Follrath, 114 Minn. 85, 130 N. W. 542 (1911); Morrison v. Chapman, 155 App.
Div. 509, 140 N. Y. S. 700 (1913); Indemnity Mutual Marine Assur. Co. v. Powell &
O'Rourke Grain Co., 216 Mo. App. 673, 271 S. W. 538 (1925) ; Union Home Furnishing
Co. v. National Bank of Commerce in St. Louis, 53 S. W. (2d) 1067 (1932) ; 1 MEACHAM
ON AcENCY, 687 (2d ed. 1914). It is interesting to note that in each of these jurisdictions
which hold the drawer's obligation to the payee is discharged when the checks, which
were indorsed and cashed without authority by the payee's agent, are paid by the drawee
bank, a recovery is allowed by the payee directly from the drawee bank on the theory of
conversion. A Paul Goodall Real Estate & Ins. Co. v. North Birmingham American
Bank, 225 Ala. 507, 144 So. 7 (1932) ; Wayne Tank & Pump Co. v. Bank of Eureka
Springs, 172 Ark. 775, 290 S. W. 370 (1927) ; Wm. Deering & Co. v. Kelso, 74 Minn. 41,
76 N. W. 792 (1898) ; Kansas City Casualty Co. v. Westport Ave. Bank, 191 Mo. App.
287, 177 S. W. 1092 (1915) ; Burstein v. Peoples Trust Co., 143 App. Div. 165, 127
N. Y. S. 1092 (1911). Recovery on this theory was expressly disapproved in the Strickland case. Consequently, Texas reaches a different result to that reached in these states,
in that neither by going directly, or indirectly as assignee of the drawer's rights, can
the payee recoup his loss.
a0 Justices Smedley, Taylor and Garwood.

